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CHAPTER 6 
Domestic Relations 
NEIL L. CHA YET 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§6.1. Foreign divorce: Domicile and jurisdiction. One of the most 
significant domestic relations cases decided by the Supreme Judicial 
Court during the 1970 SuRvEY year was that of Ragucci v. Ragucci. 1 
This case illustrates once again that the foreign divorce is fraught with 
danger, since it is subject to invalidation by the Supreme Judicial 
Court if the facts do not conclusively demonstrate the acquisition of 
domicile in the foreign jurisdiction. 
Giovanni Ragucci married Paola Iuliano Ragucci in Pietrastornina, 
Italy, on June 14, 1953. Six days later, Giovanni returned alone to 
Massachusetts while Paola remained in Italy, where she bore a son of 
the marriage on March 28, 1954. Neither Paola nor the son ever came to 
Massachusetts. On May 19, 1954, Giovanni filed for divorce in Middle-
sex County, describing himself as a resident of Everett. This libel was 
dismissed on his own motion on January 10, 1955. On June 22, 1957, 
Giovanni filed a complaint for divorce in the Second Judicial Court of 
the State of Nevada, describing himself as a citizen of Nevada for 
more than six weeks preceding the filing of the complaint. Service was _ ~ 
made by publication and by mailing the summons and a copy of the ~ 
complaint to Iuliano Ragucci (not Paola Iuliano Ragucci, as the Court 
pointed out) in Pietrostonina [sic], Italy, without a street address. The 
wife did not appear personally and was defaulted. On July 30, 1957, a 
divorce was granted to the husband. Giovanni left Nevada on the 
same day and returned to Massachusetts, where, on December 28, 
1957, he married another woman, listing his address as Everett. 
Paola filed petition for separate support in the Probate Court, 
Middlesex County, on June 14, 1954, and on September 12, 1966. Both 
petitions were dismissed by the probate judge on February 4, 1969. 
The judge found that the husband had acted in good faith in using 
the name Iuliano Ragucci, and that the mailing of the notice was 
reasonably likely to reach her in Italy. The probate judge further 
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stated that he was unable to find that the Nevada court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree, and that therefore the Nevada 
decree was entitled to full faith and credit. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, citing Barnard v. Barnard,2 stated that 
the validity of a Nevada divorce depends upon whether the husband 
has acquired a domicile in Nevada. While the Court grudgingly con-
ceded that the Nevada decree did have a presumption of validity,a it 
concluded that the presumption was "clearly rebutted" in the instant 
case. The Court, reviewing questions of fact as well as law, noted that, 
according to the husband's own testimony, the reason he had gone to 
Nevada was that "he had consulted a lawyer in Boston who sent him 
to a lawyer in Reno because it was quicker to get a divorce there; that 
it was a question of time."4 The Court also noted that "[e]xcept for the 
trip to Italy he had lived in Massachusetts from 1949 to April, 1957, 
when he went to Nevada for a quick result."5 After emphasizing that 
Giovanni returned to Massachusetts on the same day that he had ob-
tained the Nevada divorce, the Court closed with the cryptic state-
ment: "We find that the respondent did not acquire a domicil in 
Nevada, which lacked jurisdiction to grant him a divorce for that 
reason."6 The Court therefore reversed the decrees dismissing Paola's 
petitions for separate support. 
Foreign divorces have never been well received by the Supreme 
Judicial Court, which, in Coe v. Coe1 and Sherrer v. Sherrer,8 set aside 
Nevada and Florida divorces, respectively, even though both parties 
had appeared personally in the foreign forum. These cases were later 
reversed by the United States Supreme Court,9 primarily on the basis 
that a party is estopped to deny the validity of a divorce in which that 
party participated by way of personal appearance. However, the 
foreign divorce is often sought by a single party for reasons of time 
andfor convenience. When this situation obtains, the Supreme Judicial 
Court will closely scrutinize not only the intent of the party as to 
domicile but the consistency of the facts which surround that intention. 
There are few cases indeed in which the Court has approved of the 
domicile in the single-party foreign divorce situation. One such case 
is Heard v. Hem·d,IO where the lower court had found that the wife did 
2 331 Mass. 455, 120 N.E.2d 187 (1954). 
3 The Supreme Judicial Court assumed that the probate judge had given the 
Nevada decree a presumption of validity, citing Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 324 
Mass. 340, 341, 86 N.E.2d 654 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 
233-234 (1945); and Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rei. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 
280-281 (1945). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 487, 489, 258 N.E.2d 28, 29. 
5 Id. at 489, 258 N.E.2d at 29-30. 
6 Id. at 489, 258 N.E.2d at 30. 
7 320 Mass. 295, 69 N.E.2d 793 (1946). 
s 320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946). 
9 334 u.s. 343, 378 (1947). 
10 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E.2d 219 (1948). 
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not in good faith acquire domicile in Nevada. The Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed this finding, primarily on the basis that the wife had 
bought a home in Reno, this being an essential element of her burden 
of proving that she did not intend to remain in Massachusetts. A 
review of the cases in the area of foreign divorce demonstrates that 
such a divorce in all probability will stand if both parties have ap-
peared in the foreign forum, despite the fact that the establishment of 
domicile is as questionable on the facts as it is in situations where only 
one party has obtained the divorce. The Ragucci case makes it quite 
clear that if one party has not appeared, the question of domicile 
becomes crucial. The Court, as noted above, has the power to review 
all questions of fact and law; and if upon review the inference may be 
drawn that the facts do not support the stated intention of the party 
who has obtained the divorce, the Court will not hesitate to overturn 
the findings of fact of the probate judge. 
§6.2. Separation agreements: Collusion: Mergers: Subsequent mod-
ification. During the 1970 SuRVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court 
decided several cases dealing with questions that are potential causes 
for concern in virtually every separation agreement. In Smith v. Smith,l 
the husband sought to have a separation agreement declared void, 
arguing that it was the result of collusion and therefore contrary to 
public policy. He alleged that the following statement was by its 
nature a product of collusion: "the wife shall forthwith proceed with 
a libel for divorce on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment and 
the husband will not contest said libel." It was argued that the 
foregoing constituted a collusive compact to compel the probate 
court to act upon only a partial disclosure of the real facts. By with- J, 
holding a defense which might prevent a divorce, the parties had ~ 
perpetrated a fraud on the court, since they had been allowed "vir· 
tually to dissolve a marital relationship by agreement." 
The Supreme Judicial Court chose not to confront the issue of 
collusion. Rather it noted that the probate judge had denied a petition 
for modification filed by the husband, not on the bash of the agree-
ment, but because the awarded alimony and support was "equitable, 
reasonable and proper." The Court thereby reaffirmed a principle that 
is essential to a determination of the reliability of the terms in separa-
tion agreements: "It is settled that a separation agreement does not 
deprive the Probate Court of its power to modify its decree relating 
to alimony for the wife or support for the children."2 Hence the 
probate court retains the power to modify its decree despite the fact 
that the agreement containing the provisions in question had been 
incorporated into the decree and had thus become part. of the decree. 
The Court pointed out that, in order to modify provisions for alimony 
and support incorporated into the divorce decree, it was not necessary 
§6.2. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 265 N.E.2d 858. 
2 Id. at 9, 265 N.E.2d at 859. 
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to set aside or or revise the agreement. It is for the probate judge to 
decide whether the provisions in the original decree should continue 
or be altered.3 Thus, not only did the Court fail to deal with the 
question of collusion, it also cast a great deal of doubt upon the reli-
ability and meaningfulness of separation agreements in general. 
A related question which continually arises in connection with 
separation agreements is the impact of requesting that the agreement 
be merged or not merged with the decree. The case of Hills v. Shearer4 
involved a decree in which payments for support and maintenance, as 
contained in the agreement, were adopted as the payments of alimony 
and support and maintenance of the child. The agreement was modi-
fied by the parties several times; and on May 19, 1965, on the hus-
band's petition, the probate court entered a decree further reducing 
the husband's payments. The wife brought a bill for a declaratory 
judgment in Superior Court, claiming that the agreement was a valid 
and binding contract, the enforceability of which is independent of 
decrees enforced by the probate court. The Superior Court judge so 
ordered, and the husband appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the Superior Court's ruling holding that an examination of 
the entire agreement showed that "the parties did not intend it to be 
superseded by the decree."5 
This decision points up the importance of specifying that an agree-
ment should expressly provide that it is intended to survive the decree, 
if this is in fact the intent of the parties. In the Smith case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court emphasized that a probate court is the final arbiter of 
disputes regarding provisions of a divorce decree in cases where the 
parties' separation agreement has been incorporated therein. The 
probate court is thus empowered to "set aside or revise the agree-
ment."6 In the Hills case, however, the Court held that a separation 
agreement, "adopted" by the probate court in its order, could not be 
subsequently amended by the probate court because the agreement was 
a "contract" between the parties and existed independently of the 
divorce decree. Hence, in Smith, the probate court could determine the 
reasonableness of the terms of a separation agreement after its "in-
corporation by reference" into the decree, and could modify these 
terms if they were found to be unreasonable. Yet, according to Hills, 
the probate court did not have the power to reduce the husband's 
payments because it could not amend the contract between the parties. 
The only distinguishing factor regarding the separation agreements 
in the two cases was the wording by which the probate court merged 
the agreement with its decree. The decree in Hills, as quoted by the 
Court, stated: 
3 Ibid. 
4 355 Mass. 405, 245 N.E.2d 253 (1969). 
5 Id. at 408, 245 N.E.2d at 256, citing Freeman v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652, 84 N.E.2d 
16 (1949). 
6 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 9, 265 N.E.2d-858, 859. 
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... that the provisions of said agreement as to payments for the 
support and maintenance of said libellant and said child are 
adopted as the payments ... which the libellee is hereby ordered 
to make.7 [Emphasis added.] 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that this language wa:; not sufficient 
to supersede the contractual terms of the agreement. In Smith, the 
separation agreement was " 'incorporated' in the divorce decree and 
'made part ... [thereof] by reference.' "8 The Court then held that 
the probate cotirt could consider the provisions contained in the 
agreement and yetermine their reasonableness if a modification 
were sought. However, in its opinion, the Court directs attention to 
the fact that the "decree adopted the support provisions of the agree-
ment since it incorporated the agreement by reference."9 (Emphasis 
added.) The "adoption" then appears to be the key to the agreement's 
becoming part of the decree, thus enabling the probate judge to sub-
sequently amend its terms. The Court may well consider the phrase 
"incorporated by reference" to extinguish the contract as it is merged 
into the decree and, at the same time, consider "adoption" as merely 
granting a formal recognition of an extant contract, which remains in 
effect as binding on the parties. 
It is submitted that the Court's reference to and reliance upon 
"adoption" in these two cases is misleading. The Court should clarify 
in precise terms when it will recognize a separation agreement as 
remaining in force, despite its becoming part of the decree, and when 
it will consider it as superseded by the decree. The distinction is crucial 
in regard to the ability to subsequently alter the terms of the decree. 
Since intent is the controlling element in this type of case,10 the parties 
and the probate court should be aware of what language will be 
necessary to effectuate that intent. Attorneys should be extremely care-
ful to define in explicit terms whether or not the agreement is to 
survive the decree. If one's client is not satisfied with the terms of the 
separation agreement, the agreement must not be allowed to survive 
the decree, for any attempt at later modification will be futile. Con-
versely, if the party is content with the terms of the agreement, care 
should be taken so as to preclude future challenges to its provisions 
by having it survive on its own terms after the divorce decree is 
issued. 
§6.3. Divorce: Petition to proceed in forma pauperis. The case 
of Coonce v. Coonce1 raised an issue of first impression for the Supreme 
Judicial Court. The libellant argued that she should be permitted to 
"proceed in Forma Pauperis to file her divorce petition without the 
7 355 Mass. 405, 406, 245 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1969). 
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 7, 265 N.E.2d at 858. 
9 Id. at 9, 265 N.E.2d at 859. 
10 Hills v. Shearer, 355 Mass. 405, 408, 245 N.E.2d 253, 256 (19159). 
~6.3. t 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 255 N.E.2d 330. 
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payment of a fifteen dollar filing fee." The motion was accompanied 
by an affidavit claiming that she was the mother of five children rang-
ing in age from one to eight years; was receiving aid for families with 
dependent children (AFDC) in the amount of $158.15 every two 
weeks; and was unable to pay the $15 filing fee without depriving her 
children of necessities. The probate judge denied the motion and the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The Court noted that the petitioner, 
receiving $79 per week, was not destitute, and determined that the 
fact that a person was qualified for AFDC and free legal services did 
not control disposition of the issue, which was basically one of fact. 
The Court deemed itself precluded from a consideration of the large 
amount of social "non-judicial evidence" since this evidence, although 
contained in the brief, had not been presented at trial. 
It is significant, however, that the Court proceeded to state that the 
probate court does have the power to grant a waiver of fees in appro-
private cases, even though there is no specific statutory authority. The 
Court relied upon G.L., c. 208, §33, which provides that "[t]he court 
may, if the course of proceeding is not specially prescribed, hear and 
determine all matters coming within the purview of this chapter ac-
cording to the course of proceedings in ecclesiastical courts or in courts 
of equity."2 The Court then felt it necessary to consider the course of 
judicial proceedings in the period from the Magna Carta in 1212 to 
the independence of the United States in 1776. Stating that detailed 
records of proceedings in these centuries were not available or readily 
accessible, the Court added that "[t]here is, however, sufficient reliable 
information to enable us to conclude with reasonable certainty that 
in forma pauperis proceedings were then recognized, allowed and 
used in the course of proceedings in ecclesiastical courts and in courts 
of equity."3 
Thus, while Mrs. Coonce was not found to be sufficiently impov-
erished to have her own fee waived, she can at least rest assured that 
others less fortunate than she will be able to proceed in forma 
pauperis. 
§6.4. Stubborn child statute: Definition of child. A serious 
blow was dealt the "stubborn child" statute1 in the case of Joyner v. 
Commonwealth.2 The complaint filed in the district court charged that · 
"Camille E. Joyner, a minor, during the three months next before 
the making of this complaint, was a stubborn child and stubbornly 
refused to submit to the lawful and reasonable commands of said com-
plainant, said Sarah Bell, whose commands said minor was bound to 
obey."a Camille appealed from her conviction which resulted in a 
2 Id. at 158, 255 N.E.2d at 332. 
aId. at 159, 255 N.E.2d at 333. 
§6.4. 1 G.L., c. 272, §53. 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1169, 260 N.E.2d 664. 
aId. at 1169, 260 N.E.2d at 664·665, quoting from the complaint issued in the 
district court. 
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suspended sentence of ten days in the House of Correction. She claimed 
that she was not a "child" within the meaning of the statute; that 
the statute was "unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and uncertain"; 
and that the imposed sentence constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The Court agreed that Camille, eighteen years of age, was in-
deed not within the purview of the statute, noting that: it would be 
anomalous if an eighteen-year-old girl could be legally married with-
out her parents' consent,4 yet be subject to punishment for refusing 
to obey her parents' command not to see her intended husband. The 
Court chose not to deal with the remaining grounds of appeal. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§6.5. Power of court to bar spouse from marital home during 
pendency of proceedings. The legislature was also active in the 
field of family law during the 1970 SuRvEY year. A persistent problem 
was purportedly solved by the passage of Chapter 472 of the Acts of 
1970.1 The new section provides that any court having jurisdiction 
of libels for divorce, annullments, or separate support petitions may, 
during the pendency of such libel or petition, order the husband or 
wife to vacate the marital home for a period not to exceed 60 days if 
the court finds that the "health, safety or welfare of the petitioner or 
libellant or the minor children of the parties would be endangered 
or substantially impaired by a failure to enter such an order." Three 
days' notice of the hearing must be given to the respondent husband 
or wife. 
Prior to this statute, all that a judge could do to force a husband 
to depart the marital home in a situation where the wife or children 
were endangered, but had no funds to move out themselves, was to 
give an extraordinarily high temporary support order which he would 
reduce if the husband decided to leave the marital home. While this 
was highly effective in many cases, a considerable number of judges 
would not resort to this procedure. Section 34B provides a much more 
appropriate means of obtaining the desired result. The statute could 
be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds if the marital home 
were owned solely by the party forced to vacate and, conceivably, 
even in the case of jointly owned property. However, it: is submitted 
that the question of danger to the spouse andfor minor children, the 
requirement of a hearing, and the fact that the time period during 
which the party can be barred is limited to 60 days probably would 
be controlling and would preserve the statute. 
§6.6. Separate maintenance proceeding: Effect of decree directing 
conveyance. The legislature also added Section 32D to Chapter 209 
4 G.L., c. 207, §7. 
§6.5. I Amending G.L., c. 208, by adding §34B. 
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of the General Laws.1 This section provides that, in a petition for 
separate support, a decree directing that a deed, conveyance, or re-
lease of real estate be made (I) creates an equitable right to its en-
forcement, and (2) if not complied with within three months, vests 
title in the petitioner. This is consistent with Section 32C, which has 
accomplished the same result in libels for divorce. 
§6.7. Residence requirement: Filing divorce libel for cause occur-
ring elsewhere. The legislature relaxed the residence requirement 
for a person who wishes to be divorced in Massachusetts but has never 
lived in Massachusetts with his or her spouse, and whose grounds for 
divorce have arisen elsewhere. Section 5 of G.L., c. 208, reduces the 
residence requirement for persons so situated from five years to two 
years.1 
§6.8. Adoption: Consideration of religion. Sections 5A and 5B 
of G.L., c. 210, were amended to remove the emphasis upon religion 
as a factor in adoption.1 Section 5A had required that, in the case of 
adoption of children under the age of 14, the Department of Public 
Welfare was to determine the suitability of the petitioners and their 
home, "due regard being given the race and religion of the child and 
of the petitioner." This portion of the statute was removed by the 
amendment. Section 5B, which has been the source of great hardship, 
provided that the judge "when practicable must give custody only to 
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child." The amend-
ing act decreases the emphasis upon religion by stating that the 
judge must consider "all factors relevant to the physical, mental and 
moral health of the child" and consider religion only if the natural 
parent or parents requested a religious designation for the child. 
Even if such a request is made, the judge may disregard it if compli-
ance would not be in the best interests of the child. 
These amendments have been long-awaited and the legislature 
has taken appropriate action to retain religion as an important con-
sideration, particularly if the natural parents deem it to be so. 
However, it is no longer the paramount issue that it once was. 
§6.9. Legislation affecting the parent-child relationship. Various 
relationships between parents and children also received attention by 
the legislature. Section 6 of G.L., c. 117, was amended1 to eliminate 
the liability of a parent to contribute to the support of a child 21 
or over who is poor or indigent, while Section 8 of Chapter 1182 
imposed such liability if the child is 21 or over and is totally and 
permanently disabled, and if the parents are sufficiently able to make 
such a contribution. 
§6.6. 1 This section was added by Acts of 1970, c. 450. 
§6.7. 1 This section was amended by Acts of 1969, c. 162. 
§6.8. 1 These sections were amended by Acts of 1970, c. 404, §§2-3. 
§6.9. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 343, §1. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 343, §2. 
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Chapter 119 was amended by adding Section 29A,8 which provides 
that the parents of an unemancipated minor are liable for "reasonable 
legal fees and expenses of an attorney . . . incurred by such minor 
in connection with criminal proceedings ... not exceeding, however, 
three hundred dollars." The section does not apply to a parent not 
in custody of such minor. 
Section 39B was added to chapter 119,4 and allows a presiding 
judge of a district court to give permission to a hospital by telephone, 
or any means of communication, to keep a child in the hospital if 
there is reason to believe that release of the child to the requesting 
parent would "be detrimental to the child's health or safety." The 
child may be kept in the hospital "until a hearing may be held 
relative to the care and custody of such child." Chapter 112 was 
amended by the addition of two sections numbered U!E. The first 
Section 12E5 provides that "[a] minor twelve years of age or older 
who is found to be drug dependent ... may give his consent to the 
furnishing of hospital and medical care related to the diagnosis or 
treatment of such drug dependency." The consent of the parent or 
legal guardian is not required; neither the parent no:r legal guar-
dian is responsible for payment for any such care. The section does 
not apply to methadone maintenance therapy. The second Section 
l2E6 provides that a physician shall not be held liable for damages 
for failure to obtain consent of a parent, guardian or spouse of a 
patient to emergency examination and treatment if a delay in 
treatment would "endanger the life, limb, or mental well-being of 
the patient." The section also relieves hospitals of liability. Except 
for possibly the addition of the concept of mental well-being, the 
statute is merely a codification of the common law in the area of 
emergency care.7 It will, however, serve a useful purpose if only to 
allay the concern of physicians and hospitals about the legal implica-
tions of rendering emergency care to minors. 
3 Acts of 1970, c. 386. 
4 Acts of 1970, c. 407. 
5 Acts of 1970, c. 816. 
6 Acts of 1970, c. 847. 
7 See Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); 76 A.L.R. 566 (1931); 
139 A.L.R. 1374 (1941). See also Chayet, Legal Implications of Emergency Care 
(1970). 
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